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The Economic Implications of the
Reunification of Hong Kong with
China
Edwin L.-C. La
ABSTRACT

Professor Lai presented this essay at the Vanderbilt
Journal of Transnational Law Symposium 1997: Hong
Kong's Reintegration into the People's Republic of China.
Professor Lai has updated his work since Hong Kong and
China reunifled. The author questions whether Hong Kong
will really be able to remain an independent economic entity
while also being a dependent political entity under the
unprecedented "one country, two systems" concept.
In this essay, the author identifies the conditions under
which Hong Kong's economy can prosper, both in the short
term and the long term. After reviewing Hong Kong's recent
economic performance, the author assesses the potential
economic problems of political integration. Potentialproblems
include corruption, threats to the rule of law in Hong Kong,
self-censorship by the press, and disruption of Hong Kong's
tax system.L
The author concludes that, despite these
problems, prosperity will likely be sustained in the short term.
For economic prosperity to continue in Hong Kong in the long
term, however, the continued expansion of the Chinese
capitalist class must continue. As Hong Kong becomes
increasingly integrated with China economically, it will also
be increasingly susceptible to China's economic woes. Thus,
for Hong Kong's economy to prosper in the long term, China
must remain stable both politically and economically.

* Assistant Professor of Economics, Department of Economics and Business
Administration, Vanderbilt University. B.Sc., University of Hong Kong, 1980;
A.M., Stanford University, 1988; Ph.D., Stanford University, 1991.

The author

would like to thank Anthony Tang for his useful comments on an earlier draft of
this paper.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reunified with China, ending
156 years of British colonial rule. This reunification took place
under the concept of "one country, two systems," a concept
unprecedented in history.

According to the Sino-British Joint

Declaration signed in 1984, China promises to maintain the
status quo of Hong Kong for fifty years by establishing a highly

autonomous "special administrative region" (hereinafter Hong
Kong SAR) in Hong Kong.' Specifically, Hong Kong is to maintain
the existing British-style legal system, establish its own court of
final appeal, retain fiscal independence from the central
government, and retain its own currency. Hong Kong Is to remain
an independent customs territory, a free port, and a separate
entity in most international economic and cultural organizations,
such as the World Trade Organization, the Multi-fiber Agreement,
2
and the Asian-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum.
Under the "one country, two systems" concept, although
Hong Kong cannot be an independent political entity, it can be a
1.
See Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the
Question of Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, P.R.C.-U.K., 23 I.L.M. 1366 [hereinafter
Joint Declaration].

2.

Id. See also Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

of the People's Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1511.
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highly economically independent entity from the rest of China.
The first reason China is willing to allow such a special status for
Hong Kong is the vast economic importance of Hong Kong to
China. After Deng Xiaoping adopted the open-door policy for
China in 1978, Hong Kong emerged as the most important source
of foreign investment in China. About sixty percent of- foreign.
direct investment in China between 1979 and 1995 came through
Hong Kong. 3 Hong Kong also serves as an important bridge
connecting China to the rest of the world and is a source of
managerial technology transfer into China. Maintaining the

economic status quo of Hong Kong ensures that China can
continue to benefit from it. Second, China hopes to lure Taiwan
to reunify with the mainland under the "one country, two
systems" concept. China's leaders think that, if all goes well with
Hong Kong, it will be difficult for Taipei to reject Beijing's offer to
reunify under an even more generous package than Hong Kong's.
China is a developing country with an authoritarian
government and largely rudimentary economic infrastructure; in
contrast, Hong Kong is a modem capitalistic society with a
British-style legal system, the rule of law, and one of the most
free-wheeling economies in the world. In fact, it is widely believed
that the pillars of Hong Kong's past economic successes are the
rule of law, the freedom to transmit information and conduct
economic activities, and a small, clean, efficient, and noninterventionist government. China is grossly inadequate in these
aspects. Given such a big gap between the two systems, it is
natural for one to doubt the feasibility of a smooth integration as
promised by China.
The fact is, whether one likes it or not, China is in control.
Given that China is very sensitive to any potential challenge to its
regime, one should be pessimistic about Beijing permitting any
real democratic reform. Moreover, civil liberties in Hong Kong will
very likely be rolled back. The new Hong Kong SAR government
has already reversed some laws that have been modified in
accordance with the Bill of Rights introduced by the British
shortly before July 1, 1997. 4
In short, what the highest
leadership in China would like to implement in Hong Kong is the
Singapore model-economically free but politically paternalistic.
The question is, putting aside political pessimism, how optimistic
can one be about Hong Kong's economy after 1997?

3.
A Survey of China-Ready toface the world?, ECONOIST, Mar. 8, 1997,
at 9.
4.
Bill of Rights Ordinance, No. 59, Legal Supp. No. 1, Hong Kong
Government Gazette A399-A433 (June 7, 1991).
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In this essay, the author attempts to identify the conditions
under which Hong Kong's economy can prosper, in the short term
as well as the long term. Part II reviews Hong Kong's recent
economic performance. Part III analyzes the factors that will
affect Hong Kong's short-term prosperity. Part IV suggests a
scenario that would support long-term economic prosperity in
Hong Kong. Finally, Part V present the author's assessment of
Hong Kong's short-term and long-term prospects for economic
success.

II. HONG KONG'S RECENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
One must realize that, political reintegration or not, economic
integration of Hong Kong with China began in 1978, when Deng
Xiaoping opened China's door. As a result of such economic
integration, the structure of Hong Kong's economy underwent
tremendous change:
1. Hong Kong re-emerged as a major entrep~t, with trade in
goods expanded by forty-four times and trade in services
by twenty-six times over the two decades from 1975 to
1995. 5 In 1995, re-export was eighty-three percent of the
total value of exports, and eighty-eight percent of re6
exports involved China as either a source or destination.
2. Of the total $133.2 billion worth of foreign direct
investment in China between 1979 and 1995, 58.8% was
channeled through Hong Kong, followed by 8.7% through
Taiwan. 7 Most of these finns produce goods for export.
By 1995, 31.5% of China's exports was from foreigninvested enterprises.8
3. More than four million people were estimated to be
working in the southern province of Guangdong for Hong
Kong companies by 1995. 9
4. Hong Kong now serves as a major funding center for
China. Hong Kong serves not only as a direct source of
funding, but also as a window through which China can
gain access to external borrowing through syndicated
loans, issuing certificate of deposits, and bonds.10
5. The economic integration led to an unprecedented,
accelerated structural transformation of the Hong Kong

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Hong Kong 1996, at 48 (Info. Serv. Dep't ed., 1996).
IcL at 54, 93.
See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
Id. at 10.
Hong Kong 1996, supranote 5, at 54.
IcL at 80-81.
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economy. Manufacturing output as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (hereinafter GDP) declined from twentyfour percent in 1980 to nine percent in 1994, and
manufacturing employment dropped from forty-two
percent of total employment in 1980 to eighteen percent in
1995.11 This occurred because most factories moved to
the mainland, where the cost of labor is one-tenth of that
in Hong Kong. 12
6. As a result of cost cutting in manufacturing and
tremendously increased trade opportunities, real GDP per
capita grew by an average of about six percent from 1975
to 1995.13 In 1995, Hong Kong's stock market was the
world's eighth largest in total market capitalization, and
14
the second largest in Asia.
7. As for China's presence in Hong Kong, "in the last decade,
and particularly in the last five years, Chinese companies
have flooded Hong Kong, buying property, wooing foreign
deal makers, looking for capital and perhaps not least,
finding a safe haven for great piles of hot money from
China."1 5 It is estimated that "the vast percentage of
Chinese companies [in Hong Kong] are busily transferring
assets from China, to the tune now of [US]$65 billion
16
annually."
III. SHORT-TERM PREDICTIONS ABOUT HONG KONG'S ECONOMY
Will the above promising economic performance become
history after July 1, 1997? This Part discusses the potential
harm of the political reintegration to Hong Kong's economy, how
these problems might be partially mitigated, and under what
circumstances the political reintegration will not excessively
jeopardize Hong Kong's economy.

11.

Id. at 49.

12.

Id. at 92-93.

13.
14.
15.

Id. at49.
Id. at 48.
Edward A. Gargan, China Already Entrenched as a Hong Kong

Capitalist N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1996, at Al.

16.

Id.
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A. PotentialEconomic ProblemsAfter Reunification
The greatest potential problem of political integration, as far
as the economy is concerned, is probably corruption. The
author's concern is that the Chinese Communist Party
princelings-the sons and daughters of the high level officials in
the Chinese government and the Communist Party-will bring
with them the business practice of exchanging favors (which is
effectively giving and receiving bribes) to get things done, and that
the Hong Kong SAR government will not have the authority to
restrict such practices if those involved have connections with the
highest officials and influential figures in China.
Before July 1, 1997, Hong Kong had the Independent
Commission Against Corruption (hereinafter ICAC), which was
highly independent and was directly under the governor. 17 It Is
doubtful that such independent status of the ICAC can be
maintained after 1997. Even if it is maintained, however, there
will not be a truly level playing field for business without a truly
independent judiciary. This leads to the author's next concernthe rule of law.
Although the Joint Declaration promises that an independent
judiciary will remain, many worry that the courts cannot remain
truly independent after reunification. For example, many people
are concerned that the highest leadership in the central
government may intervene into the operation of Hong Kong's
judiciary system when people with close ties to high officials in
the central government are prosecuted under Hong Kong's laws.
The third problem is self-censorship by the press and media
for fear of political retribution by China. Although there is not yet
any evidence of political retribution against the press resulting
from criticism of Chinese policies, the fact that the People's
Liberation Army is stationed in Hong Kong is a forceful reminder

of the presence of an authoritarian regime in the North. This selfcensorship will in time erode the freedom of expression and
creativity of the citizens, which will in turn harm the traditional
competitive edge of Hong Kong.
The fourth potential problem is that the tax system in Hong
Kong might not remain intact and that fiscal independence in
Hong Kong might not be maintained. Given that the central
government has an acute shortage of revenue, it might be
tempted to break the promise of fiscal independence for Hong
Kong and tap into its huge foreign exchange reserves. If the
central government has an acute shortage of funds, it might be
tempted to "invite" the government of the Hong Kong SAR to

17.

Hong Kong 1996, supranote 5, at 19.
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"voluntarily" (and, possibly, temporarily) siphon some of Hong
Kong's reserves to Beijing. It might also want to increase the tax
rate on some Hong Kong companies to deter mainland firms from
establishing shell companies in Hong Kong to avoid the higher
taxes of the mainland.
B. FactorsFavorableto Short-Term Prosperity

Despite the above potential problems, there are several
important factors that will tend to sustain economic prosperity in
Hong Kong, at least in the short term.
The first is the Taiwan factor. The Chinese government
wants to use Hong Kong as a showcase to lure Taiwan to unify

with the mainland under the umbrella of "one country, two
systems." The Chinese government regards reunification with
Hong Kong and Taiwan as a matter of national pride. In this
regard, Taiwan is worth many Hong Kongs. Although Beijing
could use force as a last resort to take back Taiwan, it has every
reason to strive to achieve reunification by peaceful means.
Taiwan is watching closely how Hong Kong is handled by the
mainland, because what happens in Hong Kong will be an
indicator of how Taiwan would be handled under reunification
with the mainland. Any missteps in Hong Kong by the Chinese
government, and the Taiwan question becomes more complicated.
As soon as the Taiwan question is resolved, however, this
incentive will dissipate.
Second, the maintenance of Hong Kong as a venue for
external funding, banking, insurance, and enforcement of
contracts will benefit the emerging capitalists in China. Some of
these people have strong connections with the establishment in
the central government and they can have significant influence
over policies toward Hong Kong. For the same reason, foreign
capital, which China badly needs, has a strong stake in
maintaining the integrity of Hong Kong's legal system and rule of
law. These interest groups can provide strong leverage for the
reform-minded factions in the Chinese Communist Party and the
central government.
For the above reasons, in the short term it is likely that the
central government has the will to give the Hong Kong SAR

government the authority to act like an "independent economic
entity." In the near future, it is also likely that the central
government has the power to prevent units such as the military,
the foreign ministry, or local governments in the mainland from
bypassing central control and interfering with the affairs of Hong
Kong.
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There is no doubt that many things can go wrong to
jeopardize Hong Kong's economy in the long run. But are there
scenarios of a sustained prosperity in Hong Kong after 1997? If
so, how likely are they?
The crucial factor for Hong Kong to remain prosperous is, of
course, for the three pillars of economic success to be maintained.
In this regard, the strongest ally of Hong Kong is the emerging

Chinese capitalist class and the affiliated Chinese middle class
that serves its interests. To them, maintaining Hong Kong as a
level playing field and a free economy is important to sustaining
and perpetuating their existence. The continued expansion of
this capitalist class is crucial to sustained growth in the Chinese
economy, which in turn is crucial to the survival of the Chinese
Communist Party.
One can draw an analogy to Europe between the middle of
the fifteenth century and the middle of the eighteenth century.
This period was marked by the emergence of a merchant class
that shaped the development of capitalism, as well as challenged
the political power of the feudal aristocracy. 18 In the end, the
weak became strong, and capitalism won. Interestingly, many
members of the aristocracy may have prospered from the
emergence of capitalism by converting to capitalists themselves. 19
Similar developments could happen in China in the next fifty
years. With the emergence of the telephone, airplane, fax
machine, and the Internet in the twentieth century, it is possible
that what took Europe three centuries to develop could happen in

China in fifty years.
If this scenario prevails, in time, China could gradually
strengthen the rule of law (especially with respect to property
rights and enforcement of contracts), reduce government
involvement in the economy (especially the state sector), develop
better market infrastructure, and allow for a less restricted flow of
information. The government could become more transparent in
order to gain legitimacy.

18.

See genera!ly NATHAN

GREW RICH:
(1986).

19.

Id.

ROSENBERG & L. E. BIRDZELL JR., How THE WESr
THE EcONOMIc TRANSFORMATION OF THE INDusTRIAL WORLD 71-109
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V. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POST- 1997 HONG KONG ECONOMY

A. Summary of Short-Term Prospects

Corruption, especially in the form of exchanging favors, will
likely become more common than before reunification. The rule
of law will probably be undermined, because people with strong
ties to the central government may have incentives to interfere

with the operation of the legal system to their favor. Provided
that the central government has the will and power, however,
these problems can still be confined to manageable limits. If that
is true, Hong Kong's status as a regional and international
financial center can be maintained. In fact, it can continue to
prosper because of China, at least in the next five years.
Real estate prices will be an increasing burden to growth
because of the limited quantity of land in Hong Kong. One
possible solution is for Hong Kong to extend its urban
development to neighboring cities of Shenzhen and Macao, or
Zhongshan county to become a Greater Hong Kong metropolitan
area; however, the fact that these neighboring areas have a
different socio-political system from Hong Kong means that many
Hong Kongers may not be willing to move to these areas, and that
the expansion of Hong Kong's city boundary might be slow.
Economic integration with southern China and beyond will
continue. Hong Kong's manufacturing and services will continue
to move to the mainland. Hong Kong's structural transformation
to a service-dominated economy will also continue. Businesses
and professionals in Hong Kong will continue to benefit from
China's growth, but Hong Kong's unskilled and less-educated
workers will continue to suffer. Income inequality will probably
continue to increase for this reason. The Hong Kong government
will probably resist the demand for more grassroots democracy or
labor rights because the executive and legislative branches will
very likely continue to be overwhelmingly dominated by business
interests.
China will continue to benefit from Hong Kong's investment
and technology transfer, as well as its position as a venue for
external financing, enforcing contracts, settling accounts,
banking, and insurance.
B. Summary of Long-Term Prospects
Hong Kong's economy will be increasingly
that of China. For this reason, the Hong Kong
increasingly vulnerable to Chinese economic
economic downturns. Hong Kong will prosper

integrated with
economy will be
woes, such as
only if China is
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politically stable and economically healthy. Long-term political
prospects in China are uncertain, however. Income inequality,
regional disparity, corruption, and legitimacy of the Communist
government can all lead to power struggles in the party, resulting
in problems ranging from policy swings to chaos to civil war in
more serious circumstances.
Nonetheless, a civil war in China is still a remote possibility.
The more likely scenario is that of policy swings between tight
(shou) and loose (fang), without undermining the general direction
of further market reform. If this is the case, then there will be
high potential for the Hong Kong economy, because there are
good reasons to believe that China can continue to grow as reform

deepens, despite the many problems.

Hong Kong will then

further specialize in services, especially finance, insurance, and
banking. It could become an even more important international
financial center and bridge between China and the advanced
world than it is today.
The author's long-term assessment of Hong Kong's post-1997
economy can be summarized by an analogy. The long-term
investments in Hong Kong will carry "high risk but high (average)
return." Whether one is willing to invest depends on one's
preferences. If one is willing to take the risks that are inevitably
associated with high average returns, this is a good opportunity.
Risk-averse investors might have second thoughts.
VI. CONCLUSION

The idea of Hong Kong as a highly independent economic
entity but not a political or legal entity independent from
mainland China is a paradox to most western academics.
Nonetheless, this dualism could be sustained and eventually
eliminated if China itself continues to evolve in favor of the
interests of the emerging capitalist class and its affiliated middle
class. After 1997, Hong Kong will likely be a battlefield between
the newly emerging Chinese capitalist class and the Chinese
Communist aristocrats. One knows who is more likely to win in
the end, having seen what happened in Europe in the eighteenth
century. Viewed in this light, the uncertainty in the interim
seems more bearable.
Furthermore, reunification with China is probably not the

most important factor determining Hong Kong's economy after
July 1, 1997, especially in the short-term. Barring drastic and
unfavorable political developments in China, Hong Kong's future
economy depends more on what happens inside Hong Kong than
on China or any other external factors. For example, because the
prices of real estate have soared in the last five years, the cost of
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doing business has increased tremendously.

The fact that

neighboring areas have a different system from that of Hong Kong
means that Hong Kongers will still want to live within the old
territorial
boundaries, unless
the social
and
physical
infrastructures of these neighboring areas can quickly catch up
with those of Hong Kong.
The current educational system
produces graduates of rather low quality, who are weak in skills,
creativity, and language ability (both Chinese and English). Such
a workforce is incompatible with a modem capitalist economy
that depends on innovative individuals with independent
thinking. Such problems, internal to Hong Kong, outweigh those
20
associated with reunification in the next five to ten years.
After July 1, 1997, the new government of the Hong Kong
SAR vowed to put both housing and education reform on the top
of its policy agenda. These are clearly areas that have been
neglected by the British colonial government.
This is an
opportunity for the Hong Kong SAR government to demonstrate to
Hong Kong and to the world that reunification of Hong Kong with
China makes Hong Kong even better than before. The world must
wait and see whether the Hong Kong SAR government can fulfill
its promises.

20.
Louis Kraar, The Real Threat to China'sHong Kong, FoRTuNE. May 26,
1997, at 84.

